Abdul Qadeer Khan, ڈاکٹر عبد القدیر خان

Abdul Qadeer Khan HI, NI (twice)
Born	27 April 1936 (age 74) Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh,British India
Residence	Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory
Nationality	Pakistan
Fields	Metallurgical engineering
Institutions	URENCO Group Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology (GIKI)
Alma mater	Karachi University Technical University Berlin Catholic University of Leuven Delft University of Technology St. Anthony's College
Doctoral advisor	Martin J. Brabers
Other academic advisors	Bashir Syed
Notable students	Friedrich Tinner
Known for	Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program
Influenced	Bashir Syed
Notable awards	Hilal-i-Imtiaz (14-8-1989) Nishan-i-Imtiaz (14-8-1996 and 23-3-1999)

Abdul Qadeer Khan, (D.Eng., Sc.D., H.I., N.I. (twice)) (Urdu: ڈاکٹر عبد القدیر خان ); (born 27 April 1936), best known as Dr. A. Q. Khan, is a Pakistani nuclear scientist and a metallurgical engineer, widely regarded as the leader of gas-centrifuge enrichment technology for Pakistan's nuclear program. A founder of Pakistan's gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program, Khan built and orchestrated Pakistan's gas-centrifuge program. His middle name is alternatively rendered as Quadeer, Qadeer or Gaudeer, and his given names are usually abbreviated to A.Q.. In a July 2010 interview, Khan said that he is still regarded as a Mohajir.

After years of home arrest, Islamabad High Court on 6 February 2009 declared Khan to be a free citizen of Pakistan, allowing him free movement inside the country. The verdict was rendered by Chief Justice Sardar Muhammad Aslam. In September 2009, expressing concerns over the Lahore High Court’s decision to end all security restrictions on Khan, the United States warned that Khan still remains a "serious proliferation risk".

Early life

Khan is an ethnic Pathan or Pashtun  born in Bhopal, India, in 1936. His father Abdul Ghafoor Khan was an academic who retired from the Education Department in 1935 and settled permanently in Bhopal. In 1947, the family, migrated from India to Pakistan. Khan studied in St. Anthony's High School, Lahore and then enrolled at the D. J. Science College of Karachi, where he studied physics and mathematics under the supervision of noted solar physicist Dr. Bashir Syed. He obtained a B.Sc. degree in 1960 from the University of Karachi, majoring in physical metallurgy. After graduation, he worked as an inspector of weight and measures in Karachi. In 1961, he went to West Germany to study metallurgical engineering at a Technical University of Berlin. He obtained an engineer's degree (Technology) in 1967 from Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands, and the Doctor of Engineering degree in metallurgical engineering under the supervision of Martin Brabers from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium, just outside of Brussels, in 1972. Khan wrote his thesis in fluent German.

Work in the Netherlands

In 1972, the year he received his D. Eng., Khan through a former university classmate, Friedrich Tinner, and a recommendation from his old professor and mentor, Martin J. Brabers, joined the senior staff of the Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory (FDO) in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. At first, he was responsible for evaluating high-strength metals to be used for centrifuge components. FDO was a subcontractor for URENCO Group, the uranium enrichment facility at Almelo in the Netherlands, which had been established in 1970 by the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the Netherlands to assure a supply of enriched uranium for European nuclear reactors. According to Khan's deputy, Ghulam Dastigar Alam, Khan was very fluent in German, French and English languages, and FDO administration gave a drawing of a centrifuge machine for translation to Khan. The URENCO facility used Zippe-type centrifuge technology to separate the fissile isotope 235U from non-fissile 238U by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas at up to 100,000 revolutions per minute. The technical details of these centrifuge systems are regulated as secret information and subject to export controls because they could be used for the purposes of nuclear proliferation.

In the early 1970s, Khan had enjoyed a distinguished career and was one of the most senior scientists at the nuclear plant where he worked. He had privileged access to the most restricted areas of the URENCO facility as well as to documentation on the gas centrifuge technology.

Uranium enrichment

Initiation

A.Q Khan had a good and mutual relationship with Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. India's first successful nuclear test on 18 May 1974, codenamed Smiling Buddha, greatly alarmed the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan scrambled to establish a nuclear capability.

Khan, at this time working in a centrifuge production facility in the Netherlands, began to approach Pakistani officials offering to help with Pakistan’s nuclear program. At first, he approached a pair of Pakistani military scientists who were in the Netherlands on business. The Pakistani military scientists discouraged him by saying: "As a metallurgical engineer, it would be a hard job for him to find a job in PAEC (Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission)".

Khan wrote to Bhutto, saying, "he sets out his experience and encourages Prime Minister Bhutto to make a nuclear bomb using uranium, rather than plutonium, the method Pakistan is currently trying to adopt under the leadership of Munir Ahmad Khan".

In December 1974, Khan went to Pakistan to meet Bhutto and PAEC Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan, where he tried to convince Bhutto to adopt uranium as the best approach rather than plutonium. Bhutto did not agree to halt the plutonium effort but moved to begin a parallel uranium program. Later that evening, Bhutto met with his close friend Munir Ahmad Khan in his house, where he told him that, "He [Abdul Qadeer Khan] seems to make sense."

Uranium enrichment program

Main article: Project-706

The uranium enrichment program was announced in 1972. Work began in 1974 by PAEC as Project-706. A. Q. Khan joined the project in the spring of 1976 and with Lieutenant-General Zahid Ali Akbar Khan took over the project from another nuclear engineer, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood in July of that year. He named it the Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL) at Kahuta, Rawalpindi. General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq(late) subsequently renamed it Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). By 1981, the enrichment project was fully functional.

Proliferation of URENCO technology

A.Q. Khan then established a proliferation network through Dubai to smuggle URENCO nuclear technology to Khan Research Laboratories. He then established Pakistan's gas-centrifuge program based on the URENCO's Zippe-type centrifuge.

Khan's lab was initially focused purely on enrichment, and was not involved with other phases of the nuclear project, including the actual design, development and testing of weapons, which remained under PAEC. Nor was it involved in upstream activities: uranium exploration, mining, refining and the production of yellow cake as well as the conversion of yellow cake into uranium hexafluoride gas, the feedstock for enrichment. Nor was it responsible for civil and military nuclear reactor projects or the reprocessing program, which also remained under PAEC.

Competition

Main articles: Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and Munir Ahmad Khan

KRL and PAEC were fierce rivals. A. Q. Khan was a staunch critic of M. A. Khan's work. The Atlantic Monthly described the two as mortal enemies. However, M. A. Khan's team of nuclear engineers and nuclear physicists at PAEC believed that they could run the reactor without Canadian assistance, and they insisted that with the French extraction plant in the offing, Pakistan should stick with its original plan. Bhutto did not disagree, but saw the advantage of mounting a parallel effort toward enriched uranium.

In the early 1980s, KRL also sought to develop nuclear weapons and claimed to have carried out at least one cold test in 1983. PAEC had carried out the first cold test on 11 March 1983, and in the following years conducted 24 cold tests of different weapons designs.

KRL launched other competing weapons development projects, such as the nuclear-capable and liquid-fueled Ghauri missile. In the early 1980s, PAEC developed the solid fueled Shaheen ballistic missile.

KRL produced both weapon and reactor grade plutonium to level the competition with PAEC. However, while PAEC developed the indigenous capability to develop the program, Khan's team anticipated and richly contributed to the country's first Battlefield Range Ballistic Missile (BRBM), the Hatf BRBM program, collaborating with the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO).

1998 tests

Main articles: Chagai-I

Abdul Qadeer Khan is left to the Army Engineering Core's
Lieutenant-General Zulfikar Ali, 1998.

The competition between KRL and PAEC became highly intense when India tested its nuclear bombs, Pokhran-II, in 1998. India's second test caused great alarm in Pakistan. Then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came under intense public pressure to conduct its own nuclear tests. Khan repeatedly met with Sharif, trying for permission to test Pakistan's nuclear weapons in Chagai. Despite his efforts, Sharif instead chose PAEC, under Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad.

The decision was questioned by Pakistani civil society. However, Sharif sought to mitigate the intense rivalry between PAEC and KRL by asking Khan to provide enriched uranium to PAEC. Nawaz Sharif also urged both KRL and PAEC to work together in the national interest. KRL's enriched uranium ultimately led to the successful detonation of Pakistan's first nuclear device on 28 May 1998. Two days later, on 30 May, a small team of scientists belonging to PAEC, under the leadership of dr. Samar Mubarakmand, tested a Plutonium-based nuclear device. According to a Pakistani defense analyst, the plutonium-based device was much more powerful than the uranium device, the theoretical yield of the device was reported to 12-18 Kt. But recently on an interview with dr. Shahid Masood of Ary Television Network, Khan had urged that the second nuclear test was also based on Uranium-fissile fuel, though he did not provide any evidence to his claim. The tests were greeted with jubilation in both countries; in Pakistan, Khan was feted as a national hero. The United States immediately imposed sanctions on both India and Pakistan and publicly blamed China for assisting Pakistan.

Suspicions of outside involvement

Pakistan's uranium enrichment capability developed so rapidly that observers suspected outside assistance. It was reported that Chinese technicians had been at the facility in the early 1980s, but suspicions soon fell on Khan's activities at URENCO. In 1983, Khan was sentenced in absentia to four years in prison by an Amsterdam court for attempted espionage; the sentence was later overturned on appeal on a legal technicality. Khan rejected any suggestion that Pakistan had illicitly acquired nuclear expertise: "All the research work [at Kahuta] was the result of our innovation and struggle," he said in 1990. "We did not receive any technical know-how from abroad, but we cannot reject the use of books, magazines, and research papers in this connection."

U.S. objections

In 1987, a British newspaper reported that Khan had confirmed Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear weapons development capability, saying that a U.S. intelligence report "about our possessing the bomb (nuclear weapon) is correct and so is speculation of some foreign newspapers". The Pakistani government disavowed the statement. Then Khan denied giving the statement, but later retracted his denial. In October 1991, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported that Khan had repeated his claim at a dinner meeting of businessmen and industrialists in Karachi, which "sent a wave of jubilation" through the audience.

During the 1980s and 1990s, Western governments became increasingly convinced that China, Pakistan, and North Korea were collaborating on nuclear technology and ballistic missiles. "U.S. intelligence operatives secretly rifled A.Q. [Khan's] luggage ... during an overseas trip in the early 1980s to find the first concrete evidence of Chinese collaboration with Pakistan's nuclear bomb effort: a drawing of a crude, but highly reliable, Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapon that must have come directly from Beijing, according to the U.S. officials."[citation needed] In October 1990, KRL's activities led the U.S. to terminate economic and military aid to Pakistan, which led to a freeze in Pakistan's nuclear weapons development program. But in July 1996 Khan said, "at no stage was the program of producing nuclear weapons-grade enriched uranium ever stopped".

The American clampdown may have prompted an increasing reliance on Chinese expertise. In 1995, the U.S. learned that KRL had bought 5,000 specialized magnets from a Chinese company, for use in enrichment.

Proliferation investigations

North Korea and Iraq

It was reported that Pakistani technology was being exported to North Korea. In May 1998, Newsweek magazine alleged that Khan had sent nuclear know-how to Iraq, an allegation that he denied. United Nations arms inspectors apparently discovered documents discussing Khan's purported offer in Iraq; Iraqi officials said the documents were authentic but that they had not agreed to work with Khan, fearing a sting operation.

The Bush administration investigated Pakistani nuclear weapons proliferation in 2001 and 2002, focusing on Khan's personal role. In December 2002 it renewed the allegation that an unidentified agent, supposedly acting on Khan's behalf, had offered nuclear weapons expertise to Iraq in the mid-1990s. Khan strongly denied this allegation and the Pakistani government declared the evidence to be "fraudulent". The United States responded by imposing sanctions on KRL.

Al Qaeda and the Taliban

Khan came under renewed scrutiny following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan. It was alleged that al-Qaeda had made repeated efforts to obtain nuclear materials to build either a radiological bomb or a crude nuclear bomb.

In late October 2001, the Pakistani government arrested three nuclear scientists, all with close ties to Khan, for suspected connections to the Taliban.

Iran and Libya

In 2003, Libya gave up nuclear weapons-related material including these centrifuges that were acquired from Pakistan's AQ Khan nuclear "black market".

In August 2003, reports claimed that Khan had offered to sell nuclear weapons technology to Iran as early as 1989. The Iranian government came under intense pressure from the United States and the European Union to fully disclose its nuclear program and, finally, agreed in October 2003 to accept tougher inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA reported that Iran had established a large uranium enrichment facility using gas centrifuges based on the URENCO designs, which had been obtained "from a foreign intermediary in 1987." The intermediary was not named but many diplomats and analysts pointed to Khan, who was said to have visited Iran in 1986. The Iranians turned over the names of their suppliers and the international inspectors quickly identified the Iranian gas centrifuges as Pak-1's, the model that Khan developed in the early 1980s. In December 2003, two senior staff members at Khan Labs were arrested on suspicion of having sold nuclear weapons technology to the Iranians.

Although he was not arrested, Khan was summoned for "debriefing". On 25 January 2004, Pakistani investigators reported that Khan and Mohammed Farooq, a high-ranking manager at KRL, had provided unauthorized technical assistance to Iran in the late 1980s and early 1990s, allegedly in exchange for tens of millions of dollars. Pakistan Army's former Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg was also implicated. The Wall Street Journal quoted U.S. government officials as saying that Khan had told the investigators that General Beg had authorized the transfers to Iran.

In December 2003, Libya announced that it had agreed to abandon its undisclosed weapons of mass destruction program. Libyan government officials were quoted as saying that Libya had bought nuclear components from various black market dealers, including Pakistanis. U.S. officials who visited the Libyan uranium enrichment plants reported that the gas centrifuges used there were very similar to the Iranian machines. The IAEA officials also visited the Libyan nuclear plant where they found models of Paksat-1. Interpol arrested three Swiss nuclear scientists, who were Khan's close associates.

Investigation, dismissal, confession, pardon and aftermath

The Pakistani government's blanket denials became untenable as evidence mounted of illicit nuclear weapons technology transfers.

Pakistani government's investigation

The government investigated Khan's activities, arguing that if there had been wrongdoing, it had occurred without the government's knowledge or approval. Critics noted that virtually all of Khan's overseas travels, to Iran, Libya, North Korea, Niger, Mali, and the Middle East, were on Pakistan government aircraft. Often, he was accompanied by senior members of Pakistan's nuclear establishment.

According to Western sources, Khan had three motivations: 1) defiance of Western nations and an eagerness to pierce the "clouds of so-called secrecy," 2) eagerness to empower Muslim nations, and 3) money. Much of the technology was second-hand from Pakistan's own program and involved many of the connections he had used to develop the Pakistani bomb.

The full scope of the Khan network is not fully known. Centrifuge components were apparently manufactured in Malaysia with the aid of South Asian and German middlemen, and used a Dubai computer company as a false front. In Malaysia, Khan was helped by Sri Lanka-born Buhary Sayed Abu Tahir, who shuttled between Kuala Lumpur and Dubai to arrange for the manufacture of centrifuge components by a Malaysian company. Khan Research Laboratories is said to have entered into an agreement with Malaysian businessman Shah Hakim Zain to export conventional weapons to Malaysia.

The Khan investigation also revealed how many European companies were defying export restrictions and aiding the Khan network. Dutch companies exported thousands of centrifuges to Pakistan as early as 1976, and a German company exported facilities for the production of tritium (for hygdrogen bombs to the country.

The investigation exposed Israeli businessman Asher Karni as having sold nuclear devices to Khan's associates. Karni is currently awaiting trial in a U.S. prison. Tahir was arrested in Malaysia in May 2004 under a Malaysian law allowing for the detention of individuals posing a security threat.

In September 2005, Musharraf revealed that after two years of questioning Khan — which the Pakistani government insisted to do itself without outside intervention — that they had confirmed that Khan had supplied centrifuge parts to North Korea. Still undetermined was whether Khan passed a bomb design to North Korea or Iran that had been discovered in Libya.

Dismissal

Khan's open promotion of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles became something of an embarrassment to Pakistan's government. The United States government became increasingly convinced that Pakistan was exchanging nuclear weapons technology for ballistic missile technology. In the face of strong U.S. criticism, in March 2001 the Pakistani government dismissed Khan from his post as head of KRL, a move that drew strong criticism from the opposition to General Pervez Musharraf. Perhaps in response to this, Musharraf appointed Khan to the post of "Science Advisor to the President" with the status of federal minister. While this could be regarded as a promotion, it removed him from hands-on management and allowed the government to keep a closer eye on his activities. In 2002, the Wall Street Journal quoted unnamed "senior Pakistani Government officials" as conceding that Khan's dismissal from KRL had been prompted by the U.S. government's suspicions. On 31 January, Khan was dismissed from his post as the Science Advisor to the President ostensibly to "allow a fair investigation" of the allegations.

Confession

In early February 2004, the Government of Pakistan reported that Khan had signed a confession indicating that he had provided Iran, Libya, and North Korea with designs and technology to aid in nuclear weapons programs, and said that the government had not been complicit in the proliferation activities. The Pakistani official who made the announcement said that Khan had admitted to transferring technology and information to Iran between 1989 and 1991, to North Korea and Libya between 1991 and 1997 (U.S. officials at the time maintained that transfers had continued with Libya until 2003), and additional technology to North Korea up until 2000.On 4 February 2004, Khan appeared on national television and confessed to running a proliferation ring.It is publicly believed[who?] and A.Q Khan also has clearly mentioned several times on media that the Musharaf Govt pressured him to read false confession statement.

Pardon and U.S. reaction

On 5 February 2004, the day after Khan's televised confession, President Musharraf pardoned him. However, Khan remained under house arrest.

The United States imposed no sanctions following the confession and pardon. U.S. officials said that in the War on Terrorism, it was not their goal to denounce or imprison people but "to get results." Sanctions on Pakistan or demands for an independent investigation of the Pakistani military might have led to restrictions on or the loss of use of Pakistan military bases needed by US and NATO troops in Afghanistan. "It's just another case where you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar," a U.S. government official explained.[citation needed] The U.S. also refrained from applying further direct pressure on Pakistan to disclose more about Khan's activities due to a strategic calculation that such pressure might topple President Musharraf.

In a speech to the National Defense University on 11 February 2004, President Bush proposed to reform the IAEA: "No state, under investigation for proliferation violations, should be allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors—or on the new special committee. And any state currently on the Board that comes under investigation should be suspended from the Board. The integrity and mission of the IAEA depends on this simple principle: Those actively breaking the rules should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules." The Bush proposal was seen as targeted against Pakistan which, then served on the Board of Governors. It has not received attention from other governments.

In western media, Khan became a major symbol of proliferation. In February 2005, he was featured on the cover of Time magazine as the "Merchant of Menace", labeled "the world's most dangerous nuclear trafficker," and in November 2005, the Atlantic Monthly ran "The Wrath of Khan", featured a picture of a mushroom cloud behind Khan's head on the cover.

In May 2006, the U.S House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation held a hearing titled, "The A.Q. Khan Network: Case Closed?" Legislators and experts demanded that Pakistan turn Khan over to the U.S. and further Pakistani efforts to curb proliferation. In June 2006, a Pakistani Senate subcommittee issued a unanimous resolution criticizing the U. S. committee, stating that Pakistan would not turn Khan over to U.S. authorities.

In February 2009, two senior government officials announced that restrictions on Khan had been removed, allowing him to meet friends and relatives either at his home or elsewhere in Pakistan. The officials said that a security detail continued to observe his movements.

Aftermath

Calls for IAEA access

Since 2005, and particularly in 2006, there have been renewed calls by IAEA officials, senior U.S. congressmen, European Commission politicians, and others to make Khan available for interrogation by IAEA investigators, given lingering skepticism about the disclosures made by Pakistan regarding Khan's activities. In the U.S., these calls have been made by elected U.S. lawmakers rather than by the U.S. Department of State, though some interpreted them as signaling growing international discontent with the Musharraf regime.

End of investigation

Neither Khan nor any of his alleged collaborators have faced further charges in Pakistan, where he remains an extremely popular figure. Khan is lauded for his belief that the West is inherently hostile to Islam. In Pakistan's strongly anti-U.S. climate, action against him posed political risks for Musharraf, who faced accusations of being too pro-U.S. from key leaders in Pakistan's Army. A complicating factor is that few believe that Khan acted alone and the affair risks gravely damaging the Army, which oversaw and controlled the nuclear weapons development program and of which Musharraf was commander-in-chief, until his resignation from military service on 28 November 2007.

It has also been speculated that Khan's two daughters, who live in the UK and are UK subjects (thanks to their part-British, part-South African mother Henny), possess extensive documentation linking the Pakistani government to Khan's activities; such documentation is presumably intended to ensure that no further action is taken against Khan. Conversely, high-profile government members, such as Muhammad Ijaz-ul-Haq, as well as political opposition parties have expressed their support for Khan.

Army proliferation involvement

In December 2006, the Swedish Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (SWMDC) headed by Hans Blix, a former IAEA chief and United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) chief; said in a report that Khan could not have acted alone "without the awareness of the Pakistani Government".

On 4 July 2008, in an interview, Khan blamed President Musharraf and the Army for the transfer of nuclear technology, claiming that Musharraf was aware of all the deals and he was the "Big Boss" for those deals.

Khan said that Pakistan gave centrifuges to North Korea in a 2000 shipment supervised by the army. The equipment was sent in a North Korean plane loaded under the supervision of Pakistani security officials. He also said that he had traveled to North Korea in 1999 with a Pakistani Army general to buy shoulder-launched missiles. Asked why he had taken sole responsibility for proliferation, Khan said friends, including a central figure in the ruling party at the time, had persuaded him that it was in the national interest. In return he had been promised complete freedom.

Khan wrote to journalist Simon Henderson on 10 December 2003, saying that he was acting precisely under the orders of the Pakistani government when he sold weapon designs to North Korea, Iran and Libya. Khan also says that Pakistan built a centrifuge plant for China in Hanzhong province, in exchange for enriched uranium. Nuclear weapons expert David Albright of the ISIS agrees that Khan's activities were government-sanctioned.

Other activities

Space program

In the late 1990s, Khan sought to re-organize and revitalize the Pakistani's national space agency, SUPARCO, especially in the SUPARCO-proposed projects. In 1980s, Khan had participated in the development Hatf-I Ballistic missile program. Khan was increasingly involved in Pakistan's first Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) project, and in March 2001, Khan announced that Pakistani scientists were in the process of building the country's first Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) and that the project had been assigned to SUPARCO, which also built the Badr satellites.

Khan worked closely with SUPARCO's scientists on the development and construction of Pakistan's first indigenously constructed launch facility and space port, Tilla Satellite Launch Center. Khan also cited the fact that India had made rapid strides in the fields of SLV and satellite manufacture as another motivation for developing an indigenous launch capabilities. In 1999, Khan briefed then-chief executive of Pakistan Pervez Mushrraf describing his self-designed Low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite. He also suggested that Pakistan should launch a satellite from its own launch centers. But Musharraf did not grant him permission. He was highly disappointed and wrote about it in his column. On 10 December 2001, Pakistan launched its second Low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite instead from Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan aboard a Russian Zenit-2.

Pundit

On 12 November 2008, he started writing weekly columns in The News International and Daily Jang. His columns heavily emphasized the education and engineering disciplines. Khan has gained even greater respect through his columns among Pakistanis. Khan also expressed his views on environmental issues. Even though his columns heavily focused on the issues of education, Khan severely criticized Pervez Musharraf and his policies, in which he blamed them for the growth of the Taliban insurgency.

Metallurgy education

Khan played an important role in the establishment of engineering universities in Pakistan. As both PAEC Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan and Ishfaq Ahmad established a nuclear physics and a nuclear engineering university, Pakistan Institute of Applied Sciences and Engineering. Khan established a metallurgy and material science institute in Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology. He also served as its both executive member and director there. Khan played an important and key role in establishing the Dr. A. Q. Khan Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering at Karachi University. Khan introduces metallurgical engineering courses in many newly-founded universities and sciences colleges in Pakistan.

Health matters

Cancer

On 22 August 2006, the Pakistani government announced that Khan was undergoing treatment for prostate cancer. On 9 September 2006, Khan had surgery at Aga Khan hospital, in Karachi. According to doctors, the operation was successful, but on 30 October it was reported that his condition had deteriorated and he was suffering from deep vein thrombosis.

Hospitalization

On 5 March 2008, Khan was admitted to an Islamabad hospital with low blood pressure and fever, reportedly due to an infection. He was released four days later.

]Legacy

Khan is no longer associated with Pakistan's nuclear program. However, he is still widely seen as "Father of Pakistan's atomic program" even though he was head of only the centrifuge-based enrichment project and not the other projects being run under the PAEC. Khan's involvement in nuclear proliferation was criticized by his peers and fellow scientists such as Pervaiz Hoodbhoy. However, Khan's fall affected General Pervez Musharraf's popularity. It also increased Anti-American feelings among some Pakistanis. Many people in Pakistan blamed the United States for Khan's house arrest. Many journalists and the mainstream media supported Khan and expressed their sympathies to him.

Opposition parties in Pakistan as well as coalition parties supported Khan. Ex-religious affairs minister Mr. Muhammad Ijaz-ul-Haq held a public press conference in May 2007 to express his support for Khan.

Honors and recognitions

On 14 August 1989, Khan, along with Munir Ahmad Khan, was awarded the high civilian award of "Hilal-e-Imtiaz" by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. In 14 August 1996, he was awarded the highest civilian award "Nishan-e-Imtiaz" by former Prime Minister Sharif. On 12 March 1999, he was again awarded the highest civilian award "Nishan-e-Imtiaz" from President Muhammad Rafiq Tarar. Khan is the only Pakistani who has been twice awarded the Nishan-e-Imtiaz.

Honorary degrees

Khan has honorary doctorates from many universities in Pakistan. Khan has an honorary degree of Doctorate of Science from the University of Karachi, an honorary degree of Doctorate of Science from Baqai Medical University, Karachi, a D.Sc from the Hamdard University in Karachi a D.Sc from Gomal University, an honorary degree of Doctorate of Science from the University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore.

Khan remains widely popular among Pakistanis and he is considered domestically to be one of its most-influential and respected scientists. In an interview with Pakistani political analyst Hamid Mir, Dr. Salim Farookhi described Khan as, " the most influential and talented scientist that Pakistan has produced."

Institutes

Dr. A. Q. Khan Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering (KIBGE), University of Karachi

Dr. A. Q. Khan Audiotorium Federal Urdu University, Karachi (www.fuuast.edu.pk)

Dr. A. Q. Khan Institute of Computer Sciences, Multan

Dr. A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), Kahuta

Dr. A. Q. Khan Institute of Technology (KIT), Mianwali

Dr. A. Q. Khan Ophthalmic Research Center, Al-Shifa Trust Eye Hospital, Rawalpindi

Dr. A. Q. Khan Girls College for Computer Science, Rawalpindi

Dr. A. Q. Khan College for Science and Technology, Rawalpindi

Dr. A. Q. Khan Academy of Science, Gulberg, Faisalabad

Dr. A. Q. Khan Hall and Gymnasium, Pearl Valley Public School, Rawalakot, Azad Jammu & Kashmir

Dr. A. Q. Khan Block, Al-Markaz Al-Islami, Islamabad

Dr. A. Q. Khan Center for Software Engineering, Islamabad

Dr. A .Q. Khan Institute of Computer Sciences and Information Technology, Kahuta

Dr. A .Q. Khan Institute for Developing Engineering Technologies, Lahore

Dr. A. Q. Khan Institute of Technology & Management, Islamabad

Dr. A. Q. Khan Block, D.J. Sindh Government Science College, Karachi

Dr A. Q. Khan Laboratory, Physics Department, Cadet College Kohat

Zuleikha - Quadeer Science Block, Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi

Fellowships/memberships

Islamic Academy of Sciences

Kazakh National Academy of Sciences

Pakistan Institute of Metallurgical Engineers

Pakistan Institute of Engineers

Institute of Central and West Asian Studies

Chartered Engineer and Member, The institute of Materials, London

Member of American Society of Metals (ASM)

The Metallurgical Society of the American Institute of Met. Min. and Petr. Engineers (TMS)

Canadian Institute of Metals (CIM)

Japan Institute of Metals (JIM)

Publications

Selected research papers and patents

"Topics in Physical Metallurgy" - The Burgers Festschrift - Edited by A.Q. Khan and M.J. Brabers, Elsevier F]Publishing Co., Amsterdam, August 1972. (contains ca. 35 articles & 460 pages).

Stress-induced phase transformations and enhanced plasticity in Cu-Al and Cu-Al-Zn martensites, J. Materials Science, December 1972, with G.V.D. Perre and L. Delaey.

`Topics in Physical Metallurgy' (Eds. A.Q. Khan and M.J. Brabers). , Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1972.

Dynamic recovery and recrystallization in iron-containing aluminium bronzes, Transformations Japan Institute of Metals, Volume 15, No. 2 (March 1974).

Creating a complete metallurgical engineer, Metals and Materials, April 1974.

An-X-ray diffraction study of stacking sequences, stacking faults and distortions in copper-based martensites - Application to Ci-Al and Cu-Al-Zn martensites, J. Applied Cryst., published with G.V.d. Perre, L. Delaey. H. Tas, W. Vandermeulen & A. Deruyttere, (1974).

. The Hall-Petch relationship in copper-based martensites, Materials Science & Engineering, vol.15, (1974), with M.J. Brabers and L. Delaey, pp. 263–274.

. The spread of Nuclear Weapons among nations: Militarization or Development, pp. 417–430. (Ref. Nuclear War Nuclear Proliferation and their consequences "Proceedings of the Vth International Colloquium organised by the Group De Bellerive Geneva 27–29 June 1985, Edited by: Sadruddin Aga Khan, Published by Clarendon Press-Oxford 1986).

Microstructural changes during Retrogression and reaging in AA-7075 - A TEM study, Proceedings, Aluminium Technology `86, Section B, Institute of Metals (1986).

Chromium Determination in Steel using atomic Absorption spectrophotometer? problems and their remedies, Pak Steel Journal, Vol 26, Jan-Mar. 1986.

Flow Induced Vibrations in Gas Tube Assembly of Centrifuges, Journal of Nuclear Science and technology, 23(9), (Sept. 1986), pp. 819–827.

Dilation investigation of a ® g transformation in 18% Ni maraging steels, Proceedings of The International Conf. on Martensitie Transformations (1986), The Japan Institute of Metals, pp. 560–565.

Electrical and magnetic properties of double-aged 18% nickel maraging steels, Proceedings of The International Conf. on Martensitie Transformations (1986), The Japan Institute of Metals, pp. 572–577.

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Bibliography

Sehar Honay Tak (Until the Dawn), written, edited and published by Khan.

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